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1. Introduction and Summary
This report brings the results of simulations of some oil supply
disruptions on the M.I.T. Energy Laboratory Energy Macro Model. This
model has previously been used to study the macroeconomic effects of
the 1973-74 and 1979 oil price shocks, as well as for policy simula-
-tions related to these historical events (Mork and Hall, 1980a, 1980b,
1981). Recent extensions of the model allow it to be used for simula-
tion of possible future oil supply disruptions, such as the loss of oil
deliveries from Saudi Arabia or the entire Persian Gulf region.
The extensions go mainly in the direction of more explicit modeling
of thedomestic energy sector and of the world oil market. Although
very important, these extensions are still in an experimental stage.
Richard Gilbert of the University of California at Berkeley provided
invaluable help in modeling the domestic energy sector. The short-run
functioning of the world oil market was modeled along the lines suggested
by Chao and Manne (1980). Sanjay Srivastava provided useful research
assistance in preparing and programming the solution algorithm for the
model. None of these persons are, however, in any way responsible for
the contents of this report.
Three basic disruption scenarios are analyzed, of 3, 10, and 18
million barrels per day (mmbd) on the world level, respectively. Disrup-
tions are modeled as leftward shifts in the world supply curve for oil
(OPEC's 'price reaction' curve). All disruptions are assumed to last
for one year, but another three years are assumed to be needed to restore
the lost capacity. Each disruption scenario is simulated under three
different policy assumptions. The first case assumes no new policy.
The second case assumes a specific tariff on oil imports, rising from
$2.50 in 1981 to a long-run value of $10.00 in 1984. In the third
case, an ad valorem tariff is introduced gradually in the same way,
from 7.5 percent of the world price in 1981 to 30 percent in 1984. As
a last exercise, a 10 mmbd disruption is simulated under the assumption
that all relative prices adjust perfectly to clear all markets.
Oil supply disruptions are found to add substantially to inflation
during the disruption year and to cause substantial real losses. For a
10 mmbd disruption (the possible loss of Saudi Arabia), 6.4 percentage
points are expected to be added to the inflation rate in the disruption
year, and the net social cost in real terms is projected as $489 billion
in 1980 dollars. An 18 mmbd disruption (the possible loss of the
Persian Gulf) is expected to lead to an 8 percent drop in real GNP in
the year of the disruption, to add 14 percent to the inflation rate and
6.5 percent to the unemployment rate in the same year, and to incur a
net loss of $1,010 billion in 1980 dollars.
The two tariffs are found to lead to very similar results. The ad
valorem tariff may hold a slight edge over the specific tariff by
reducing transfer the real income to oil exporters during a disruption
by slightly more than it increases the loss due to unemployment. Both
tariffs are, however, clearly inferior to the alternative of no new
policy because of the added losses and inefficiencies in normal periods.
If all prices and wages were free to adjust instantaneously, so that
full employment were maintained everywhere during a disruption, then the
3world oil market would be.much higher and the price increase more than
three times as high. This effect of unemployment on oil prices provides
an automatic stabilizer in the world market and is an important part of
the explanation of the apparent resilience of the U.S. economy to large
disturbances in the world oil market.
2. The Model
The model used is an extended version of the model presented
by Mork and Hall (1980b). This section outlines the changes and
extensions relative to that version.
Domestic Energy Supply
The most important change is that the supply of energy is modeled
explicitly rather than treating its price as exogenous. Domestic
supply of aggregate energy is modeled according to the theory of ex-
haustible resources. Domestic firms are assumed to take the price of
energy as given. The cost of extraction is given by the marginal
cost function
cE(R,S,t) = eAt c RV + c2 e - p S  (1)
where R is the extraction rate, S the resource stock, t is time, and
cl , c2 , v, p, and A are parameters. v decreases over time.
Its value is very high in the early periods, so that the marginal
cost of extraction beyond a critical level (1/cl) quickly becomes
very high. This formulation approximates short-run capacity
limits and gives a very low short-run supply elasticity.
As energy resources are extracted over time, marginal extraction
cost increases. This is reflected in the second term of (1), which
makes the marginal cost curve shift vertically. A leftward shift
seems reasonable as well, reflecting reduced extraction capacity when
the stock is decreased. This effect is approximated by a multiplica-
tive time trend in the first term. The trend formulation was chosen
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because it is easier to solve dynamically than a formulation with
an explicit multiplicative dependence on S.
By excluding relative prices, (1) assumes implicitly that a homo-
geneous good (the output of the goods and service sector) is the only
input to energy extraction. By avoiding labor and capital in the
energy sector as explicit variables, this formulation facilitates
greatly the numerical solution of the model.
The assignment of parameter values for the energy sector is based
on similar principles as the rest of the model. Rather than estimating
each parameter from time series data, such values have been picked
as give reasonable projections. R is measured in 1972 billion dollarrs
(at 1972 energy prices). cl is chosen so as to give a realistic
initial value of R. v declines from 25 in the disruption year to a
long-run value of 4 from the 6th year after the disruption. x and p
equal 0.077 and 0.007, respectively. The value of c2 serves only to
set a scale for S, as will be seen below. Its actual value, 1012, has
no independent meaning.
Dynamic programming implies the following arbitrage condition
for domestic energy supply:
r(P-c) = E - (ac/aR)k - (ac/av) - ac/at , (2)
where PE is the real price of energy, r the real interest rate, and
dots denote time derivatives. In the solution of the model, r is
taken from the solution of the goods and service sector, and the time
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derivatives are approximated by forward-looking first differences.
A producer tax or subsidy can easily be added to (2).
The model assumes a backstop price FE. Extraction does not stop
immediately when this price is reached, but continues until the rent
(price minus marginal cost) becomes zero at zero extraction.(1) Thus,
the terminal stock S is defined implicitly by the condition
e-p
PE c ePSE - 2
or
= (1/p) kn(c 2 /PE)
The initial resource stock SO (in 1980) is assumed to be such that
the marginal extraction cost is one eighth of the market price. Thus,
S = (1/p) zn[c 2 /(P/8)] .0 2
The solution of the model uses the transversality condition that
total extraction equals the difference between So and S:
JR(t)dt = So 
- 
= (1/p) kn(8CE/P).
0
(1)The backstop technology is used in the model only eventually. Over-
shooting of the backstop price can occur in earlier periods, for
example, as the result of a supply disruption.
Since c2 does not enter in this condition, its value is inessential
for the solution.
With the marginal cost function (1) in a continuous-line model,
extraction approaches zero only approximately. For the discrete
approximation used here, extraction is "cut off" when it becomes suf-
ficiently low. The time of cut-off is determined by simple discrete
search.
Oil Import Supply
The world oil market is modeled by a simple static import supply
curve or price reaction function for the first six years of the solu-
tion. For the remaining period, the world price of oil is assumed to
follow a constant-growth path (2 percent annual real increase) until
the backstop price is reached. The import supply curve is modeled
along the lines suggested by Chao and Manne (1980). It consists of
two parts. First, OPEC pricing is assumed to follow the price reaction
curve
Po = c+ , (3)
0 k-Q
where Po is the real world price of oil, k is OPEC capacity, and Q is
world demand for OPEC oil. The parameters c and d are chosen so that
the world price for 1980 is $35 per barrel and the marginal cost of
oil for the non-OPEC world,
P, = P + Q
o o (k-Q)
equals $65 for 1980.
A disruption is modeled by modifying (3) as
P = c + (l-)d, (3')
S( - )k-Q
where e is the disruption in percent of OPEC capacity. Obviously, an
increase in E shifts the price reaction curve to the left along the
Q-axis.
It should be emphasized that the static price reaction curve is
a very crude way of modeling the behavior of OPEC's members. The
curve represents, at best, a short-run relationship. Thus, we may
expect the price reaction curve to shift in response to policy.
Determination of oil import supply for the United States also re-
quires a model of non-U.S., non-OPEC demand. This is modeled by
postulating a simple aggregate production function for real non-energy
output of these countries:
YF = [A(-)/o+(B(RF+MF))(-1)/]/(-) , (4)
where YF is output, RF is energy supply by these countries, and MF
their demand for imported oil. RF is assumed exogenous. The elasti-
city of substitution a rises over time from 0.04 in the disruption
year to a long-run value of 0.4 after 6 years. The parameter values
A and B are determined so that actual prices and input and output
levels in 1980 satisfy (1) and the profit-maximizing condition
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po = B(a-l)/a [YF/(RF+MF) /o . (5)
The parameter A is a proxy for capital and labor inputs. During
a disruption, the model adjusts this parameter to conform with the
relative reduction in U.S. input levels. In other words, other •
countries are assumed to experience the same recession as the United
States. Needless to say, this phenomenon softens the world oil market
considerably during a disruption. On the other hand, when the model
simulates offsetting macro-economics policies, only domestic input
levels are assumed to respond directly, so no adjustment is made in
the value of A.
Domestic energy demand for the United States is derived from the
model of the goods and service sector. U.S. import demand is then
determined as the difference between demand and domestic supply. World
demand, Q, is taken to be the sum of U.S. and foreign import demand.
The model can then be solved for the world price of oil, P . This
price is translated into the aggregate price of energy by the assump-
tion that any oil price increase above the level of the baseline solu-
tion leads to a change in the overall price of energy of 80 percent of
the oil price increase. A tariff is easily added to this formulation.
Short-run Technology
Another new feature approximates a putty-clay technology and
gives a very low demand elasticity for energy in the short run. Essen-
tially, the model assumes fixed coefficients between energy and
capital in the short run, while substitution may take place over time.
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This feature comes in addition to the quasi-fixity of capital in the
short run.
The technology is described by a unit cost function. This cost
function now has the form
1(w/P,v,PE) = [(w/Pv,PE)]g[n(w/PvPE)1-g , (6)
where w is the nominal wage rate, P is the overall price level, and v
the real rental price of capital. is the long-run, or ex ante,
cost function described in the previous publication. n is the short-
run, or ex post cost function, with the form
n(w/P,v,PE) = yo[av+ (1 -a)PE l-a (w/P)a . (7)
The parameters yo, a, and a are computed from prices and input combina-
tions that the model predicts if no shock occurs. The weight g in
(6) rises over time from 1/6 in the disruption year to a long-run
value of 1 after 6 years.
Price and Wage Determination
The overall price level is determined as a weighted geometric
average of the market-clearing price level P and a contract or admin-
istered price P, which is a fixed mark-up over variable cost:
^a -1-aP P P (8)
P = (w,Pv,PPE) (9)
S= n(w,Pv,PPE) 
,
where a is a weight increasing over time from 0.25 in the disruption
year to a long-run value of I after 4 years. The fixed mark-up v is
the mark-up that would clear the market in the absence of a disruption.
The previous version used a similar formulation, only v was then taken
as the post-disruption long-run value of the mark-up. This change
makes little difference for the analysis of oil supply disruptions,
but has substantial consequences for the projected price level effects
of monetary policy.
A slight modification was also made in the indexation of the com-
mitted wage rate w. The lag in the indexation process has been
removed, so the formulation used now is
w* = Wl + y(P-P)/P] ,
where P is the price level expected in the absence of a disruption.
This change was made only for the purpose of avoiding the wage rate
as a state variable with an initial condition, which would have compli-
cated the backward solution method of the model. The backward solution
is convenient for the two-point boundary problem implied by the model
because it-avoids the numerical instability which marred the previous,
forward solution algorithm.
On the other hand, evidence of a lag is found in the data and is
easily rationalized as an information lag. As an approximation to
the empirical evidence, the parameter y is taken to be 0.25 in the
disruption year and 0.5 thereafter. Since an oil supply disruption
results pretty much in a once-and-for-all change in the price level,
this formulation is actually very close to one with an explicit lag.
Gross National Product and Consumption
Since domestic energy extraction uses real resources, the distri-
bution of real non-energy output is changed to
Y = C + I + Z + X + G , (12)
where C is consumption, I is investment, X is net exports of non-energy
goods, G is government expenditure, and Z is resources devoted to
energy extraction. From (1), Z is defined as
Z = CE(R',S,t)dR' = ( )eAt R + + c2e-pS . (13)
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Since the model now includes the domestic energy sector, it can
compute total Gross National Product (GNP). This is defined as the
sum of value added in the two sectors.
GNP = Y-PEE+PER- Z = Y-PEM-Z (1) (14)
where E and M are domestic energy demand and energy import demand,
respectively.
(In the actual computation, oil imports is evaluated at the price of
oil, not the price of aggregate energy. Also, note that double
deflation is not used in the computation of GNP.
Since this version of the model accounts consistently for all
resource use of the domestic economy, it can be used for cost-benefit
analysis. Given the life-cycle, permanent-income formulation of con-
sumer behavior presented in the earlier publication, the initial level
of consumption can be used as a unique indicator of social welfare.
The net social cost of any event can be estimated as the discounted
sum of changes in consumption over time.
Consistent use of this criterion requires, however, an explicit
modeling of the real payment for imported oil, that is, the exchange
of non-energy exports for imported oil. Empirically, oil exporters
seem willing to accept various kinds of claims on the U.S. economy as
temporary payment and seem likely to cash in these claims for U.S.
goods only gradually and over time. In the model, this is reflected
by allowing the trade balance to be in deficit. However, it is balanced
in the long run by assuming that the discounted value of net exports
of non-energy goods equals the discounted value of present and future
oil imports. The model is then closed by assuming that oil exporters
will spread their purchases evenly over time indefinitely, in the sense
that net exports of non-energy goods will grow over time at the same
rate as domestic consumption.
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3. Disruption Scenarios Without a Tariff
The first task needed for this analysis was to construct a baseline
projection, showing the likely course of the economy in the absence of
oil supply disruptions and new policy. This baseline projection is pre-
sented in Table 1. It should be emphasized that this projection is not
meant to be a forecast; its only purpose is to serve as a basis for com-
parison.
The projections for 1980 deviate somewhat from the published pre-
liminary data. Typically, real variables are lower and the price level
higher in the projection than in the data. This is mainly due to a
difference in convention. In the published GNP data, each item is deflated
separately. Obviously, the relative price of imports (including oil)
has increased substantially since 1972. Then, since imports are sub-
tracted off in the computation of GNP, this procedure gives a much higher
value of real GNP than if nominal GNP as a whole had been deflated by a
broad-based price index for finished goods. The model uses the latter
procedure and deflates all nominal variables by the price of gross output
of the goods and service sector. Since all primary energy is used as
inputs to the goods and service sector in the model, this price index
includes energy used by consumers, such as gasoline and electricity. It
has been calibrated to correspond to the Consumer Price Index.
The model assumes no productivity growth and 2 percent annual growth
in the labor force. The relatively high long-run real growth rate
(around 3 percent) is due to the projected real increase in energy
prices over time. The expectation of rising energy prices provides an
incentive to save now for the worse times ahead.
The experimental character of the energy sector of the model should
be emphasized. For example, the lagged effect of price decontrol on
domestic supply is not accounted for. Even apart from this, the decline
rate for domestic energy production may be too high.
Since policy is to be introduced in the model in 1981, while disrup-
tions are assumed to occur unexpectedly in 1985, the construction of the
base case caused a slight technical problem. Since the model assumes
rational expectations, a scenario with a future shock and policy manipu-
lation before the shock requires the running of two versions of the model.
In the present case, the two versions start in 1980 and 1985, respective-
ly. Policy is introduced in the 1980 version without expectation of
the future shock. The 1985 version must in turn include the effect of
policy on those state variables that do not jump, in this case, the
capital shock and the domestic resource shock. The baseline projection
is put together from these two versions, both run without any shock.
The synchronization is quite close, but a slight discontinuity for
domestic energy production (and hence imports) between 1984 and 1985 is
noticeable.
Tables 2-4 show the projected results of oil supply disruptions of
3, 10, and 18 million barrels per day (mmbd) on the world level, respec-
tively. Each disruption is assumed to last for one year; however, I
assume that it takes another three years before the disrupted capacity
is restored.
The pattern of effects is very similar in the three disruption
scenarios. GNP declines dramatically in the first year. Then it re-
bounds to some extent but stays at a lower level permanently. The per-
manent loss is due to the slowing of capital formation during the
recession. Since the model does not deflate each GNP component sepa-
rately, the GNP loss includes the partial effect on real income of the
higher import bill. This effect would not be reflected directly in the
published GNP data.
Unemployment follows the pattern of GNP, but gets back to its normal
level after three or four years. The course of the price level is
interesting: It rises dramatically in the year of the disruption. It
declines thereafter relatively to its previous path, but very slightly,
and it stays at a substantially higher level permanently. The higher
permanent level is mainly the result of the reduced level of real output:
the same supply of money is being chased by fewer goods. In terms of
inflation rates, this path is.described as a large one-shot increase
followed by a near-zero effect.
The larger disruptions have, of course, larger effects. And the
increase is progressive. For the effect on consumption as well as
first-year GNP, the loss per barrel disrupted rises with the size of the
disruption.
The effect on oil prices may seem small. The reason is that the
disruption-induced recession softens the demand for oil in the United
States as well as in other countries. This automatic stabilizer in the
oil market is the explanation why an 18 mmbd disruption is not quite as
devastating as might have been thought.
The tables only give price increases in real terms. Effects of
increases in inflation on nominal prices come on top of this.
It should be noted that the price projections are for annual
averages. In the even shorter run, oil prices may,.of course, go sub-
stantially higher. It may also be noted that speculative behavior in
the oil market is reflected in the model only in the supply of domestic
energy, which is highly inelastic. But even if speculative buyer
behavior were modeled explicitly, it would not have added to the price
increase because all agents are assumed to expect that the disruption
will be over quite soon. The speculative behavior observed in 1979,
which seemed to contribute substantially to the dramatic price increase,
must have been based on a different expectation.
The slight decline in oil prices in 1988 and 1989 occurs because
the permanent decline in production levels lowers the demand for oil.
The model assumes that the price reaction curve does not move in re-
sponse to this decline. On the other hand, a return back to normal oil
prices from 1990 is imposed on the solution of the model. While a
return to normal conditions seems reasonable, it may happen more abruptly
in the model than in the real world.
The model permits computation of the total social cost of each dis-
ruption as the discounted value of the reduction in aggregate consumption.
In 1972 dollars, this is given as $60 billion, $248 billion, and $513
billion, respectively, for each of the three disruption sizes. In 1980
dollars, the corresponding figures are $119 billion, $489 billion, and
$1,010 billion, respectively.
Table 1
Baseline Projection
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990
Macro variables
GNP (1972 bill.$) 1,332.7 1,374.7 1,419.9 1,458.3 1,498.0 1,540.6 1,585.8 1,634.2 1,684.7 1,735.7 1,793.3
GNP growth (percent) -0.5 3.2 3.3 2.7 2.7 2.8 2.9 3.1 3.1 3.0 3.3
Investment (1972 bill.$) 223.0 246.8 275.3 296.9 320.9 353.8 383.1 416.4 452.7 491.9 548.4
Consumption (1972 bill.$) 848.7 865.7 883.0 900.7 918.7 937.3 956.0 975.1 994.6 1,014.5 1,034.8
Unemployment (percent) 6.9 6.4 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.1 6.1 6.1 6.1
Price level (1972=100) 197.0 215.4 235.4 257.8 282.3 308.6 337.2 368.4 402.4 439.6 480.6
Inflation (percent) 13.7 9.3 9.3 9.5 9.5 9.3 9.3 9.2 9.2 9.3 9.3
Energy variables
Price of oil (1980 $lbbl) 34.53 35.39 36.45 37.24 38.11 38.71 39.82 40.94 42.04 43.31 42.67
Price of energy (1972=100) 400.0 409.9 422.2 431.3 441.4 448.4 461.2 474.2 487.0 501.7 494.2
Energy demand (1972 bill.$) 34.2 35.0 36.0 37.1 38.2 39.7 40.9 42.1 43.4 44.7 47.0
Domestic energy production 23.3 23.2 23.0 22.7 22.1 20.5 20.2 19.7 19.1 18.0 14.5
(1972 bill.$)
Oil imports (mmbd) 7.9 8.6 9.5 10.5 11.7 14.0 15.1 16.3 17.8 19.4 23.6
r
TAble 2
3 mmbd World Oil Supply Disruption in 1985, No Tariff
Projected Deviations From Baseline Projection
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990
Macro variables
GNP (1972 bill $) -28.4 -16.8 -12.0 -10.2 -8.2 -10.1
GNP growth (percentage points) -1.2 0.8 0.3 0.1 0.2 -0.1
Investment (1972 bill $) -22.6 -14.4 -11.6 -10.6 -8.2 -10.0
Consumption (1972 bill $) -3.6 -3.7 -3.8 -3.8 -3.9 -4.0
Unemployment (percentage points) 0.7 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0
Price level (percentage change) 1.1 1.2 1.1 1.0 1.0 1.0
Inflation (percentage points) 1.3 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1
Energy variables
OPEC capacity shortfall (mmbd) 3.00 2.25 1.50 0.75 0.00 0.00
Price of oil (percentage change) 9.8 5.4 2.1 -0.2 -1.5 0.0
Price of energy (percentage change) 7.8 4.4 1.7 -0.1 -1.2 0.0
Energy demand (1972 bill $) -0.7 -0.8 -0.6 -0.4 -0.2 -0.3
Domestic energy production 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.1 -0.1 0.1
(1972 bill $)
Oil imports (mmbd) -0.8 -0.8 -0.6 -0.3 0.0 -0.3
Table 3
10 mmbd World Oil Supply Disruption in 1985, No Tariff
Projected Deviations From Baseline Projection
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990
Macro variables
GNP (1972 bill $) -121.2 -64.3 -45.3 -40.3 -34.0 -41,1
GNP growth (percentage points) -8.1 4.3 1.4 0.4 0.5 -0.4
Investment (1972 bill $) -99.5 -55.9 -43.4 -40.8 -33.1 -40.4
Consumption (1972 bill $) -14.8 -15.1 -15.4 -15.7 -16,0 -16.3
Unemployment (percentage points) 3.0 0.7 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.0
Price level (percentage change) 5.2 5.2 4.8 4.5 4.3 4.1
Inflation (percentage points) 5.7 -0.0 -0.3 -0.3 -0.2 -0.2
Energy variables
OPEC capacity shortfall (mmbd) 10.0 7.5 5.0 2.5 0.0 0.0
Price of oil (percentage change) 44.1 21.1 6.4 -1.8 -6.0 0.0
Price of energy (percentage change) 35.3 16.9 5.1 -1.5 -4.8 0.0
Energy demand (1972 bill $) -3.2 -3.2 -2.4 -1.6 -0.8 -1.4
Domestic energy production 0.9 0.7 0.5 0.1 -0.4 0.6
(1972 bill $)
Oil imports (mmbd) -3.0 -2.8 -2.1 -1.3 -0.2 -1.4
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Table 4
18 mmbd World Oil Disruption in 1985, No Tariff
Projected Deviations From Baseline Projection
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990
Macro variables
GNP (1972 bill $) 
-239.0 
-126.5 
-89.3 
-82.1 
-73.3 -84.4
GNP growth (percentage points) 
-16.0 9.2 2.8 0.6 0.7 
-0.5
Investment (1972 bill $) 
-205.9 
-112.4 
-84.3 
-80.1 
-67.3 
-81.4
Consumption (1972 bill $) 
-30.6 
-31.3 -31.9 
-32.5 
-33.2 -33.8
Unemployment (percentage points) 5.9 1.4 0.3 0.3 0.0 0.0
Price level (percentage change) 11.8 11.6 10.6 9.8 9.4. 9.0
Inflation (percentage points)
Energy variables
OPEC capacity shortfall (mmbd) 18.0 13.5 9.0 4.5 0.0 0.0
Price of oil (percentage change) 97.5 43.2 10.5 -5.0 -11.2 0.0
Price of energy (percentage change) 78.0 34.6 8.4 -4.0 -8.9 0.0
Energy demand (1972 bill $) -6.9 -6.4 -4.7 -3.2 -1.8 -2.9
Domestic energy production 1.3 1.1 0.7 -0.0 -1.3 1.3(1972 bill$)
Oil imports (mmbd) 
-6.0 -5.4 -3.9 . -2.3 -0.4 -3.0
4. Disruption Scenarios With a Specific Oil Tariff of $10 per barrel
The next exercise is to introduce a specific tariff on oil and repeat
the disruption scenarios with this policy change. I assume that, at
the beginning of 1980, the government announces a plan for a tariff on
imported oil.(1) The tariff is announced as zero for 1980, $2.50 p~r
barrel for 1981, $5.00 per barrel for 1982, $7.50 per barrel for 1983,
and $10.00 per barrel from then on. The announced tariff is given
in 1980 dollars, so an automatic adjustment for inflation is implicitly
assumed. The tariff stays in effect in the model until 1992. Only the
United States is assumed to impose a tariff.
If the price reaction curve described in Section 2 could be con-
sidered a long-run relationship, a tariff on oil would definitely reduce
the world oil price. Furthermore, since the curve is highly convex, a
reduction in demand would also mean a movement towards a flatter section
of the price reaction curve. As a consequence, a given leftward shift
in the curve -- due, for example, to a disruption -- would lead to a smaller
price increase. The latter effect would depend crucially on the second
order derivative of the curve, about which we know very little empirically.
Thus, any results obtained via this route could be spurious.
Both of these effects will be offset or reduced if OPEC's members
reduce their capacity in response to the reduction in demand, as such a
move would shift the price reaction curve to the left. Some movement
(1)This date of the announcement was chosen for technical convenience
because the implemented model version starts in 1980. An announce-
ment in 1981 would probably not make much of a difference.
in this direction seems reasonable to expect. As a somewhat extreme
assumption, I assume OPEC capacity will contract in response to the
tariff so as to keep the world price unchanged by the tariff. In the
simulations, this is done by shifting the price reaction curve to the
left so that the domestic price of oil rises by approximately the amount
of the tariff.
Obviously, this adjustment avoids the possibly spurious effect of
being at a flatter part of the price reaction curve. It also has the
effect of eliminating the buying power benefit (lowering of the world
price) of a tariff. This is part of the explanation that the model does
not preduct a positive net benefit of this policy in the absence of a
disruption, as shown in Table 5. The net loss is accounted for by two
effects. First, the small oil price shock induced by the tariff causes
a slight increase in unemployment. Second, the reduction in oil imports
leads to a loss of the positive benefit of reinvestment of OPEC funds
in U.S. securities, as discussed by Mork (1981).
Tables 6-8 show the projected disruption losses with a $10 tariff
in place. If anything, these losses are slightly bigger than the ones
projected without a tariff. Since the economy starts out from a less
advantageous point with a tariff, these results suggest clearly that this
policy would lead to a net loss.
This finding is consistent with preliminary results obtained else-
where by this author (Mork, in progress). These results suggest that a
tax or a tariff may help avoid disruption losses if the tax (or tariff)
is removed immediately when a disruption occurs. If the tax can be
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switched on and off this way, the optimal solution may be a tax in
normal times and a subsidy during a disruption. However, if the tax
is constrained to be the same whether or not a disruption occurs, the
economy may be better off without it.
Table 5
Projected Effects of Specific Tariff on Oil, Rising from $2.50/bbl in 1981 to $10/bbl in 1984.
No Disruption. Deviations From Baseline Projection
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990
Macro variables
GNP (1972 bill $) -4.7 -13.1 -12.9 -11.4 -11,1 -10.4 -13.5 -18.5 -22.1 -26.0 -31.1
GNP growth (percent) -0.4 -0.6 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 -0.2 -0.3 -0.2 -0.2 -0.3
.Investment (1972 bill $) 7.6 -2.4 -6.1 -9.9 -17.3 -16.2 -21.2 -28.7 -35.7 -44.5 -60.5
Consumption (1972 bill $) -12.3 -12.6 -12.8 -13.1 -13.4 -13.6 -13.9 -14.2 -14.5 -14.7 -15.0
Unemployment (percent) 0.3 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Price level -0.3 -0.0 0.3 0.9 1.5 1.7 2.2 2.7 3.2 3.6 4.0
(percentage change)
Inflation (percent) -0.3 0.3 0.4 0.6 0.7 0.2 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.4
Energy variables
Tariff (1980 $/bbl) 0.00 2.50 5.00 7.50 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00
Domestic price of oil 0.0 9.6 17.6 23.2 26.9 25.8 25.3 25.2 24.2 23.0 23.4
(percentage change)
Domestic price of energy 0.0 7.7 14.1 18.6 21.5 20.7 20.2 20.2 19.4 18.4 18.7
(percentage change)
Energy demand (1972 bill $) 0.1 -0.4 -1.2 -2.1 -2.9 -3.4 -3.6 -3.8 -4.1 -4.3 -4.7
Domestic energy production 0.1 0.3 0.6 0.9 1.5 0.6 0.7 1.0 1.3 1.9 3.8
(1972 bill $)
Oil imports (mmbd) 0.0 -0.5 -1.3 -2.2 -3.2 -2.9 -3.1 -3.5 -3.9 -4.4 -6.2
Table 6
3 mmbd World Oil Supply Disruption in 1985, $10/bbl Tariff
Projected Deviations From Case With Tariff and No Disruption
1985
Macro variables
GNP (1972 bill $)
GNP growth (percentage points)
Investment (1972 bill $)
Consumption (1972 bill $)
Unemployment (percentage points)
Price level (percentage change)
Inflation (percentage points)
Energy variables
OPEC capacity shortfall (mmbd)
Domestic price of oil
(percentage change)
Domestic price of energy
(percentage change)
Energy demand (1972 bill $)
Domestic energy production
(1972 bill $)
Oil imports (mmbd)
-30.2
-2.0
-24.1
-4.1
0.8
1.3
1.4
3.00
9.5
7.6
-0.7
0.2
-0.7
1986
-18.9
0.8
-15.8
-4.2
0.2
1.3
0.1
2.25
5.5
4.4
-0.8
0.2
-0.7
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1989
-8.6
1990
-11.1
-0.1
-10.1
-4.5
0.2
1987
-13.9
0.4
-12.6
-4.2
0.1
1.3
-0.1
1988
-11.5
0.2
-10.9
-4.3
0.0
1.2
-0.1
1.50
2.3
1.9
-0.7
0.1
-0.6
-7.9
-4.4
0.0
1.1
-0.1
0.75
-0.1
-0.1
-0.4
0.0
-0.3
0.0
1.1
-0.0
0.00 0.00
0.0
0.0
-0.4
-1.3
-1.7
-0.1
-0.1
-0.1
0.1
-0.3
Table 7
10 mmbd World Oil Supply Disruption in 1985, $10/bbl Tariff
Projected Deviations From Case With Tariff and No Disruptions
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990
Macro variables
GNP (1972 bill $) -127.2 -71.7 -51.5 -44.6 -35.6 -45.4
GNP growth (Percentage points) -8.6 4.2 1.5 0.5 0.6 -0.5
Investment (1972 bill $) -105.7 -61.4 -46.6 -41.7 -32.1 -40.4
Consumption (1972 bill $) -16.8 -17.1 -17.5 -17.8 -18.2 -18.5
Unemployment (percentage points) 3.2 0.9 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.0
Price level (percentage change) 5.7 5.7 5.4 5.0 4.8 4.7
Inflation (percentage points) 6.3 0.1 -0.4 -0.4 -0.2 -0.2
Energy variables
OPEC capacity shortfall (mmbd) 10.0 7.5 5.0 2.5 0.0 0.0
Domestic price of oil 42.7 21.3 6.8 -1.9 -6.6 0.0
(percentage change)
Domestic price of energy 34.2 17.1 5.4 -1.5 -5.3 0.0
(percentage change)
Energy. demand (1972 bill $) -3.2 -3.2 -2.5 -1.6 -0.6 -1.4
Domestic energy production 0.7 0.5 0.4 0.1 -0.2 0.4
(1972 bill $)
Oil imports (mmbd) -2.8 -2.8 -2.1 -1.2 -0.3 -1.3
0 a
Table 8
18 mmbd World Oil Supply Disruption in 1985, $10/bbl Tariff
Projected Deviations From Case With Tariff and No Disruptions
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990
Macro variables
GNP (1972 bill $) -244.8 -138.8 -99.6 -88.8 -75.3 -93.0
GNP growth (Percentage points) -16.2 8.8 3.0 0.9 1.0 -0.9
Investment (1972 bill $) -215.7 -122.6 -89.0 -80.3 -65.3 -80.6
Consumption (1972 bill $) -34.4 -35.1 -35.8 -36.5 -37.3 -38.0
Unemployment (percentage points) 6.4 1.6 0.3 0.3 0.0 0.0
Price level (percentage change) 13.0 13.0 11.9 10.9 10.5 10.1
Inflation (percentage points) 14.2 0.0 -1.1 -1.0 -0.5 -0.3
Energy variables
OPEC capacity shortfall (mmbd) 18.0 13.5 9.0 4.5 0.0 0.0
Domestic price of oil 93,6 43.4 10,9 -5.5 -10.0 0.0
(percentage change)
Domestic Price of energy 74.9 34.8 8.7 -4.4 -12.5 0.0
(percentage change)
Energy demand (1972 bill $) -6,8 -6.4 -4.8 -3,0 -1.5 -2.8
Domestic energy production 1.1 0.9 0.5 0.1 -0,5 0.8
(1972 bill $)
Oil imports (mmbd) -5.7 -5.3 -3,8 -2.3 -0.8 -2.6
5. Disruption Scenarios With an Ad Valorem Oil Tariff of 30% of the
World Price
An ad valorem tariff has the property of rising in terms of dollars
per barrel when the world price goes up. In this sense, it may be
thought of as a disruption tariff. An ad valorem tariff was introduced
in the model in complete analogy to the specific tariff. It was intro-
duced as 7.5 percent of the world oil price in 1981, 15 percent in 1982,
22.5 percent in 1983, and 30 percent from 1984 on. The price reaction
curve was assumed to shift to the left so as to offset any decline in
the world price, just as for the specific tariff.
Because a 30% tariff is a little more than $10 in 1985, the ad
valorem tariff comes out a little more expensive in Table 9 than the
specific tariff in Table 5. Because of some small inaccuracies in the
adjustments of the price reaction curve, the simulated domestic price
of oil is slightly higher with a specific tariff for 1981-1983, but the
long-run difference outweighs this.
The disruption scenarios look extremely similar in the two cases.
The ad valorem tariff gives a slightly larger increase in the domestic
price of oil during the disruption. This difference is even larger in
absolute terms since the oil price starts out higher with an ad valorem
tariff.
The higher oil price increase is reflected in a larger increase in
the overall price level. The unemployment effect is also slightly
higher because of the higher price shock. On the other hand, the dis-
ruption tariff recaptures some of the loss in real income. Apparently,
this effect dominates and thus accounts for the smaller loss in terms
of GNP and aggregate consumption. However, the differences are too
small to be called significant in view of the numerical inaccuracies of
the model. The significant net social cost of either tariff is a much
more clear-cut finding.
Table 9
Projected Effects of Ad Valorem Tariff on Oil, Rising from 7.5% of World Price in 1981 to 30% in 1984.
No Disruption. Deviations from Baseline Projection.
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990Macro variables
GNP (1972 bill $) -7.1 -10.2 -7.8 -5.8 -7.9 -7.0 -11.2 -17.9 -20.2 -26.2 -32.7
GNP growth
(percentage points) -0.5 -0.2 0.2 0.2 -0.1 0.1 -0.3 -0.4 -0.1 -0.3 -0.3
Investment (1972 bill $) 6.1 1.1 -0.3 -3.7 -14.2 -13.4 -20.1 -30.5 -37.2 -49.6 -67.7
Consumption (1972 bill $) -12.7 -13.0 -13.2 -13.5 -13.8 -14.0 -14.3 -14.6 -14.9 -15.2 -15.5
Unemployment
(percentage points) 0.4 0.6 0.5 0.3 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0
Price level
(percentage change) -0.4 -0.3 0.0 0.5 1.1 1.7 2.0 2.6 3.2 3.8 4.3
Inflation (percentage -0.4 0.1 0.3 0.5 0.7 0.8 0.3 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.6
points)
Energy variables
Tariff (percent of
world oil price) 0.0 7.5 15.0 22.5 30.0 30.0 30.0 30.0 30.0 30.0 30.0
Domestic price of oil
(percentage change) 0.0 7.6 14.9 21.9 29.5 29.8 30.2 31.5 29.7 29.9 30.0
Domestic price of energy
(percentage change) 0.0 6.1 11.9 17.5 23.6 23.9 24.2 25.2 23.8 23.9 24.0
Energy demand (1972 bill $) 0.1 -0.3 -0.9 -1.8 -3.1 -3.7 -4.0 -4.5 -4.7 -5.2 -5.7
Domestic energy production
(1972 bill $) 0.1 0.2 0.5 0.8 1.5 0.6 0.8 1.1 1.4 2.1 4.3
Oil imports (mmbd) 0.0 -0.4 -1.0 -1.9 -3.3 -3.1 -3.5 -4.0 -4.5 -5.3 -7.2
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Table 10
3 mmbd World Oil Supply Disruption in 1985 with Tariff
Projected Deviations from Case with 30% Tariff
Macro variables
GNP (1972 bill $)
GNP growth (percentage points)
Investment (1972 bill $)
Consumption (1972 bill $)
Unemployment (percentage points)
Price level (percentage change)
Inflation (percentage points)
Energy variables
OPEC capacity shortfall (mmbd)
Domestic price of oil (percentage
change)
Domestic price of energy
(percentage change)
Energy demand (1972 bill $)
Domestic energy production
(1972 bill $)
Oil imports (mmbd)
1985
-30.6
-2.1
-25.9
-4.2
0.8
1.3
1.5
3.00
10.0
8.0
-0.8
0.2
-0.8
1986
-19.0
0.8
-16.9
-4.2
0.3
1.4
0.1
2.25
5.8
4.6
-0.9
0.2
-0.8
at 30%
and No
1987
-14.15
0.3
-13.3
-4.3
0.1
1.3
-0.1
1.50
2.4
1.9
-0.7
0.1
-0.7
of World Oil Price.
Di sruption.
1988
-12.2
0.2
-11.4
-4.4
0.0
1.3
-0.1
0.75
-0.2
-0.2
-0.5
0.0
-0.3
1989.
-9.4
0.2
-8.1
-4.5
0.0
1.2
-0.1
0.00
-1.8
-1.5
-0.1
-0.1
-0.1
1990.
-11.8
-0.1
-10.5
-4.6
0.0
1.2
0.0
0.00
0.0
0.0
-0.3
0.1
-0.3
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Table 11
10 mmbd World Oil Supply Disruption in 1985 with Tariff at 30% of World Oil Price.
Projected Deviation from Case with 30% Tariff and No Disruption.
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990
Macro variables
GNP (1972 bill $) -123.8 -70.9 -52.3 -46.1 -37.5 -46.2
GNP growth (percentage points) -8.3 4.0 1.4 0.5 0.6 -0.5
Investment (1972 bill $) -108.2 -64.0 -48.3 .-42.2 -31.6 -40.8
Consumption (1972 bill $) -16.5 -16.8 -17.1 -17.5 -17.8 -18.2
Unemployment (percentage points) 3.3 0.9 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.0
Price level (percentage change) 5.9 5.9 5.6 5.2 4.9 4.8
Inflation (percentage points) 6.4 0.1 -0.4 -0.4 -0.3 -0.2
Energy variables
OPEC capacity shortfall (mmbd) 10.0 7.5 5.0 2.5 0.0 0.0
Domestic price of oil(percentage change) 44.6 21.7 7.0 -2.2 -7.1 0.0(percentage change)
Domestic price of energy 35.7 17.4 5.6 -1.7 -5.7 0.0
(percentage change)
Energy demand (1972 bill $) -3.2 -3.3 -2.5 -1.0 -0.5 -1.3
Domestic energy production 0.7 0.5 0.4 0.1 -0.2 0.4
S(1972 bill-0.2
Oil imports (mmbd) -2.9 -2.8 -2.2 -1.2 -0.2 -1.3
Table 12
18 mmbd World Oil Supply Disruption in 1985 with Tariff at 30% of World Oil Price.
Projected Deviation from Case with 30% Tariff and No Disruption.
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990
Macro variables
GNP (1972 bill $) 
-238.3 -137.1 -100.9 -91.0 -77.4 -93.7
GNP growth (percentage points) -16.0 8.3 2.8 0.9 1.0 -0.9
Investment (1972 bill $) -218.0 -126.0 -91.5 -60.4 -63.0 -80.4
Consumption (1972 bill $) -33.2 -33.9 -34.6 -35.3 -36.0 -36.7
Unemployment (percentage points) 6.5 1.7 0.4 0.3 -0.0 0.0
Price level (percentage change) 13.1 13.1 12.0 11.0 10.5 10.2
Inflation (percentage points) 14.3 0.1 -1.1 -1.0 -0.5 -0.3
Energy variables
OPEC capacity shortfall (mmbd) 18.0 13.5 9.0 4.5 0.0 0.0
Domestic Price of Oil
(percentage change) 93.0 43.7 11.4 -5.9 -13.6 0.0
Domestic price of energy 74.4 35.0 9.1 -4.7 -10.9 0.0
(percentage change)
Energy demand (1972 bill $) -6.9 -6.5 -4.8 -3.0 -1.2 -2.7
Domestic energy production(1972 bill $) 1.1 0.9 0.5 0.1 o -0.5 0.8(1972 bill $) -
Oil imports (mmbd) 
-5.8 -5.3 -3.9 -2.2 -0.6 -2.6
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6. A Disruption Scenario With Clearing Markets
As a final exercise, the model was used to simulate a 10 mmbd
disruption under the assumption of fully flexible wages and prices. No
tariff was assumed in this exercise. The results are displayed in
Table 13.
The most striking difference from the case of non-clearing markets
in Table 3 is the increase in oil prices. The increase for 1985 is
almost 140 percent in Table 10 compared to about 45 percent in Table 3.
This difference illustrates most of all the power of recessions as
automatic stabilizers in the oil market.
Another striking difference is in the price level effect. If all
relative prices adjust perfectly, an oil price increase may decrease
rather than increase the overall price level. The reason is that real
transactions decrease only slightly under full employment, so any effect
on the price level is dominated by the interest rate effect on money
demand. Since the interest rate is found to decline in the disruption
year, the price level declines as well.
Somewhat surprisingly, the initial loss of real GNP is almost as
large under full employment as when unemployment rises to 9 percent.
The explanation is simply that the real income transfer to oil exporters
is so much larger under full employment because the price of oil goes
much higher. However, investment suffers much less under full employ-
ment, so the long-run effects are much milder. This is reflected in
a much smaller decline in aggregate consumption. In present value
term, the projected loss of a 10 mmbd disruption is 144 billion 1972
dollars (284 billion 1980 dollars) under full employment compared to
248 billion 1972 dollars (489 billion 1980 dollars) with the full
effects.
A It
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Table 13
10 mmbd World Oil Supply Disruption in 1985.
Clearing markets, no tariff. Projected deviation from base case.
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990
Macro variables
GNP (1972 bill $) -99.1 -42.8 -27.0 -20.5 -14.0 -18.8
GNP growth (percentage points) -6.6 4.1 1.1 0.5 0.4 -0.3
Investment (1972 bill $) -40.7 -25.7 -22.2 -18.7 -13.4 -17.9
Consumption (1972 bill $) -8.6 -8.8 -9.0 -9.1 -9.3 -9.5
Price level (percentage change) -2.5 -1.0 1.7 1.8 1.8 1.7
Inflation (percentage points) -2.7 3.9 0.8 0.1 -0.0 -0.1
Energy variables
OPEC capacity shortfall (mmbd) 10.0 7.5 5.0 2.5 0.0 0.0
Price of oil (percentage change) 137.2 40.0 14.4 3.5 -2.4 0.0
Price of energy (percentage change) 109.8 32.0 11.6 2.8 -1.9 0.0
Energy demand (1972 bill $) -4.6 -2.9 -2.0 -1.2 -0.4 -0.4
Domestic energy production 1.5 1.0 0.7 0.4 -0.2 0.1
(1972 bill $)
Oil imports (mmbd) -4.4 -2.9 -1.9 -1.1 -0.1 -0.5
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